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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER'S LOSS
by Jeffrey M. Goldberg*
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs seeking to avail them-
selves of the services of the Illinois
civil court system must invest con-
siderable time, money and energy
in the endeavor. These "consum-
ers" of the legal system require
efficient and fair proceedings in
the handling of their disputes. Ulti-
mately, plaintiffs seek full compen-
sation for the losses they have
incurred.I However, many success-
ful plaintiffs may discover that
their investment in the legal system
does not pay off. In Illinois, statu-
tory and case law severely impede
the ability of victorious litigants to
recover full compensation for their
losses. This impediment stems
from the inability to recover pre-
judgment interest, which is the
interest on damages from the date
of the loss to the date of recovery.
Clearly, if a person suffers a loss
of $10,000 on January 1, 1987, but
does not recover until January 1,
1992 and is limited to the same
$10,000, the person has not been
compensated in full. In addition,
this acts as an incentive for defen-
dants to delay litigation since, in
effect, they have free use of plain-
tiffs' money. Consequently, the in-
centive for defendants to delay the
resolution of cases directly contrib-
utes to the tremendous backlog of
cases pending in the courts.
The deficiency is exemplified
where "A" wrongfully takes
$10,000 that belongs to "B." B files
suit but must wait one, two, or
more years for judgment. Mean-
while, A has invested the money at
10 percent. When judgment is en-
tered without prejudgment inter-
est, which is the current law in
Illinois, A gets to keep the interest
and B loses the interest his money
was earning for A.
A hypothetical tort case illus-
trates the problem facing the con-
sumer who seeks redress for his
injuries in a court that does not
allow prejudgment interest. Sup-
pose Stan and Oliver are driving
down a one-way street in their
identical 1980 automobiles when
they come along side of each other
at a red light. As both of them wait
in anticipation of the green light,
Charlie mistakenly turns his auto-
mobile onto the same one-way
street heading in the wrong direc-
tion. Before Stan and Oliver can
react, Charlie crashes his car
squarely into both of the their
vehicles.
Subsequently, the automobiles
are taken to the same body shop for
repairs. The mechanic scratches
his head in amazement over the
fact that the two cars sustained
identical damages to their front
ends and he repairs the cars for
$10,000 per car. The next day,
Charlie gives Stan, his boss's son,
Prejudgment interest awards
would induce defendants to
settle cases before trial to
avoid paying prejudgment
interest, consequently
reducing the backlog of
pending cases.
the $10,000 to cover the repairs.
However, Charlie decides not to
pay Oliver. As a result, Oliver is
forced to file a lawsuit against
Charlie to recover the $10,000
needed to repair his car. After four
years, Oliver's case finally goes to
trial. Oliver is successful and he is
awarded damages of $10,000
based on the mechanic's estimate.
The problem is apparent. Both
Stan and Oliver received $10,000
for the damages to their cars, but
they were not equally compensated
for their identical injuries. Stan
received his money four years be-
fore Oliver, and a dollar today is
worth more than a dollar tomor-
row. Oliver lost the interest that
could have been generated on the
$10,000 over four years. Calcula-
tion of a five percent interest rate,
over those four years, shows that
Oliver could have earned over
$2,000 on the principal. Further,
Charlie had incentive to delay the
litigation because he could have
earned that interest for himself
until the judgment was rendered.
A law that would require the
inclusion of prejudgment interest
in damage awards for cases similar
to Oliver's would achieve the goals
of fully compensating successful
plaintiffs and of reducing the back-
log of cases strangling the court
system. Prejudgment interest is the
term used for the interest that
accrues from the date of an injury
until the date of final judgment.2
Damages that include prejudgment
interest award plaintiffs the mone-
tary value of their injury from the
time of the accident until payment
of the judgment. At the same time,
prejudgment interest awards deny
defendants the benefit of the plain-
tiffs' income-generating money
throughout the litigation. Addi-
tionally, prejudgment interest
awards would induce defendants
to settle cases before trial to avoid
paying prejudgment interest, con-
sequently reducing the backlog of
pending cases.
This Article takes a four step
approach in examining the concept
of prejudgment interest. Initially,
the Article details the legal history
of prejudgment interest. Second,
the Article discusses the evolution
of prejudgment interest in Illinois,
and highlights the outdated com-
mon law and statutory law on
prejudgment interest currently in
effect. Third, the status of prejudg-
ment interest in other jurisdictions
is examined. Finally, the Article
advocates legislative enactment of
(continued on page 52)
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pending prejudgment interest leg-
islation concerning personal injury
cases, and discusses the benefits of
such legislative action.
II. Background
Historically, courts viewed the
charging of any interest on money
loaned as illegal.3 This attitude
reflected early societal beliefs that
compensation for the use of anoth-
er person's money was reprehensi-
ble. In the first agricultural societ-
ies, those who borrowed money
were the needy, and the ethical
standards of those times frowned
upon the taking of interest when
lending to a person in distress.4
Consequently, the practice of usu-
ry, whereby a person received in-
terest on money loaned, was con-
demned. Later, the ancient Greeks
and the Biblical writers adopted
these early beliefs, establishing a
solid classical foundation for the
judicial prejudice against prejudg-
ment interest. Subsequently, this
prejudice became embodied in the
common law where it has re-
mained entrenched in large part
until modem times.
It was not until the 1800's, with
the tremendous development of
industry and corresponding eco-
nomic theory, that the public be-
gan to accept the practice of allow-
ing interest on money loaned.5
Once private enterprise transcend-
ed religion's dominance over the
economy, society began to view
interest as the natural growth of
money. Merchants required loans
to finance the creation of new
business endeavors. To obtain the
financing, merchants had to pro-
vide lenders with incentives that
symbolized compensation for the
use of the money. Eventually, soci-
ety regarded the taking of interest
as corrupt only when the payments
involved an "extortionate" or "un-
conscionable" amount. 6
Correspondingly, societal per-
ceptions of interest were reflected
in the common law. The liberaliz-
ing idea was the judicial recogni-
tion of compensating the wronged
party by awarding damages for the
lost use of the money.' Thus, in
1924, Judge Learned Hand stated
the following:
Whatever may have been
our archaic notions about in-
terest, in modem financial
communities a dollar today is
worth more than a dollar next
year, and to ignore the inter-
val as immaterial is to contra-
dict well-settled beliefs about
value. The present use of my
money is itself a thing of
value, and, if I get no com-
pensation for its loss, my
remedy does not altogether
right my wrong.8
Ultimately, the level of accep-
tance of prejudgment interest, and
the various situations in which it
was recoverable, evolved on a state
by state basis.
The present use of my money
is itself a thing of value, and, if
I get no compensation for its
loss, my remedy does not
altogether right my wrong.
III. Prejudgment Interest in Illinois
As the prejudice against interest
diminished in Illinois, two catego-
ries of cases arose in which pre-
judgment interest was recoverable.
Plaintiffs could recover interest in
cases where contractual parties ex-
pressly agreed to the payment of
interest, and where provided for in
statutory law.
A. Prejudgment Interest in
Contract Cases
Because of the common law,
courts initially allowed prejudg-
ment interest only when the dam-
ages were ascertainable, or "liqui-
dated" at the time of the injury. 9
These cases usually involved con-
tract disputes in which the parties
had agreed previously on the
amount of a party's potential lia-
bility. 10 Interest was allowed in
these circumstances on the theory
that the defendants knew the
amount owed, and they should be
penalized for not promptly paying
this amount."
If the damages were "unliqui-
dated" or not ascertainable, courts
would not allow prejudgment in-
terest.' 2 In these situations, the
courts reasoned that it would be
unfair to impose a penalty on a
defendant for not paying an obliga-
tion that was uncertain in amount
until a judgment was reached.' 3
The defendants did not wrongfully
withhold the plaintiff's money and
they were unable to pay the plain-
tiff until the court determined the
amount.
Currently, case law suggests that
the liquidated versus unliquidated
theory is being abandoned, and
two new theories have arisen in
support of prejudgment interest in
contractual disputes. 14 These the-
ories are known as the "lost use
theory" and the "unjust enrich-
ment theory." The lost use theory
is based on the fact that a plaintiff
suffers the lost use of money be-
tween the time of the accident and
the judgment. Thus, prejudgment
interest awards are designed to
compensate victorious plaintiffs
for the money they could have
earned during that time.' 5
Under the second theory, pre-
vention of unjust enrichment, a
defendant's liability is thought to
arise at the time of the plaintiffs
injury. Thus, the trial is merely a
determination, after the fact, of the
defendant's preexisting liability,
and any damages subsequently
awarded are considered the plain-
tiff's property at the time of the
injury. Therefore, any interest gen-
erated on the plaintiff's money
before final judgment would un-
justly enrich the defendant, and
the delay caused by litigation
should not serve to enrich the
wrongdoer. ' 6
B. The Illinois Prejudgment
Interest Statute
In 1879, the Illinois legislature
enacted a prejudgment interest
statute that offered several provi-
sions for awarding prejudgment
interest. Specifically, these provi-
sions, which are still in effect, allow
prejudgment interest on amounts
due on bonds, bills, notes, other
written instruments, money
wrongfully taken, and money with-
held due to an unreasonable and
vexatious delay of payment." Al-
though the enactment of the stat-
ute was a significant step in the
evolution of prejudgment interest,
there are a number of weaknesses
in the statute that leave many
52 Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992
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plaintiffs inadequately compensat-
ed in civil actions.
The first weakness of the exist-
ing prejudgment interest statute is
that it exclusively applies to the
provisions specified. Traditional-
ly, Illinois courts denied prejudg-
ment interest unless a case clearly
fell into one of the statute's specific
provisions. Thus, Illinois courts
refused to award prejudgment in-
terest in tort cases based on the
argument that if the legislature had
intended prejudgment interest
awards to be allowed in such cases,
they would have included such a
provision in the statute.'8
Illinois courts have given
restrictive construction to the
statute's provisions which
could allow room for broad
interpretation.
Illinois courts have even given
restrictive construction to the stat-
ute's provisions which could allow
room for broad interpretation.
Thus, the courts construe the gen-
eral phrase "or other instrument of
writing" to apply only to writings
sharing characteristics with the
written instruments specified in
the statute. Specifically, the "other
instruments of writing" must es-
tablish a legal indebtedness in
themselves, and convey a specific,
or implicit due date.' 9 For exam-
ple, one Illinois court refused to
allow a letter in confirmation of an
oral contract to fall within the
meaning of "other instrument of
writing."'20 The court ruled that the
legal indebtedness arose out of the
oral contract, not out of the confir-
mation letter.2'
Similarly, the majority of Illi-
nois courts interpret the statutory
phrase "unreasonable and vexa-
tious delay" narrowly. Courts are
not persuaded by plaintiffs' argu-
ments that the phrase should apply
to delay in payments due to defen-
dants' initiation of legal proceed-
ings.22 One court held that if the
delay in payment is due to the
litigation process, the plaintiff
must prove "actual fraud" on the
part of the defendant to recover
prejudgment interest. 2 3 Conse-
quently, plaintiffs' attempts to
broaden the scope of the Illinois
prejudgment interest statute have
failed.
Further evidence of the statute's
inadequacy is shown by its allow-
ance of a static five percent interest
rate. The legislature has not
changed the rate to correspond
with the fluctuating interest rates
in the market, or provided the
courts with a method for adjusting
the rate to match current rates.
Ironically, the only amendment to
the 1879 prejudgment interest stat-
ute came in 1891 when the legisla-
ture decreased the interest rate
from the original six percent to the
current rate of five percent. 24 Thus,
the statutory rate provides an inac-
curate measure of the value of
money withheld. 25
Although the statute firmly es-
tablished the right to prejudgment
interest in expressly enumerated
situations, the statute's inadequa-
cies frustrate plaintiffs' efforts to
receive full compensation for their
injuries. Parties in actions that do
not fit into one of the express
categories of the statute fail to
receive full compensation. More-
over, parties who do fall into one of
Parties in actions that do not
fit into one of the express
categories of the statute fail
to receive full compensation.
the categories in the statute receive
interest arbitrarily set at five per-
cent, a level that does not necessar-
ily reflect the prevailing market
rates.
C. Current Judicial Trends in
Illinois
In Illinois, there is growing evi-
dence that courts are attempting to
award prejudgment interest in tort
cases despite the statute's silence
on the issue. Because of equitable
considerations, courts are given
broad discretion in awarding inter-
est and may give or withhold inter-
est as it deems fair and just.26
Empowered with this discretion,
some Illinois courts have allowed
prejudgment interest in certain sit-
uations not specified in the statute.
Equitable principles have also
allowed Illinois courts to recognize
that prejudgment interest may be
appropriate where a fiduciary duty
or confidential relationship ex-
ists,27 or in cases involving fraud. 28
These courts have been able to
award prejudgment interest by bas-
ing their decisions on the statute's
language regarding "unreasonable
and vexatious delay of payment. '29
These cases reflect the courts' dis-
satisfaction with the narrow scope
of the prejudgment interest statute,
and demonstrate their attempts to
achieve proper results despite the
legislative restrictions.
There is also evidence of a cur-
Courts have been able to
award prejudgment interest
by basing their decisions on
the statute's language
regarding "unreasonable and
vexatious delay of payment."
rent trend in Illinois that courts are
seeking ways to bypass the prejudg-
ment interest statute altogether.
The wrongful death case of In Re
Air Crash Disaster near Chicago,
Ill., on May 25, 1979,30 is illustra-
tive of this trend. In this case, the
court sidestepped the Illinois pre-
judgment interest statute and
awarded prejudgment interest as a
part of the plaintiffs' damages. The
court concluded that the absence of
a specific provision in the statute
does not eliminate an award of
prejudgment interest if another
state statute or equitable principle
provides for such an award.3'
Thus, the court looked to the Illi-
nois wrongful death statute which
allows damages that are deemed
"fair and just compensation. '32
The court then held that prejudg-
ment interest is an essential ele-
ment of full compensatory dam-
ages and awarded the interest. 3
Moreover, the court found equita-
ble grounds on which to award
prejudgment interest. The court
held that since there was incentive
for the defendants to delay the
litigation, and that the defendant's
liability was not questioned, the
plaintiffs were entitled to prejudg-
ment interest.3 4
These judicial attempts to side-
step the outdated prejudgment in-
terest statute demonstrate the
(continued on page 54)
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courts' willingness to allow pre-
judgment interest to fairly and
adequately compensate injured
parties. Legislative enactment of a
comprehensive statute allowing
prejudgment interest in personal
These judicial attempts to
sidestep the outdated
prejudgment interest statute
demonstrate the courts'
willingness to allow
prejudgment interest to fairly
and adequately compensate
injured parties.
injury cases would eliminate the
need for these creative approaches,
and would establish uniformity
and predictability on this issue.
D. Legislative Efforts in Illinois
In April of 1991, Illinois Senator
Rock and Illinois Representative
Madigan introduced bills to the
Illinois Senate and House, respec-
tively. The bills set forth amend-
ments to the current Illinois stat-
ute35 regarding interest on
judgments. The amendments pro-
vide that judgments recovered in
any court in actions filed after the
effective date of the amendment
will accrue interest from the date
the complaint is filed to the date
the judgment is satisfied.36 Fur-
ther, the amendments allow this
prejudgment interest to accrue at
the rate of nine percent per year.
If enacted, the bills could effec-
tively modernize prejudgment in-
terest in Illinois; however, the bills
are far from being passed into law.
On May 24, 1991, the House Judi-
cial Committee declined to pursue
enactment of the House bill and
designated the bills' official status
as "recommitted interim study cal-
endar."' 37 This cryptic status basi-
cally signifies that the bills have
been indefinitely set aside for fur-
ther examination.
IV. Prejudgment Interest in Other
Jurisdictions
A. Other States
Legislative enactment of the
prejudgment interest amendment
would align Illinois with current
trends in other states. Despite mi-
nor variances, a majority of states
are allowing prejudgment interest
in a broader range of cases. A
review of other states' treatment of
prejudgment interest highlights the
current trends in this area.
In California, for example, pre-
judgment interest can be sought in
personal injury and wrongful death
cases under section 3288 of the
California Civil Code. 38 Section
3288 states that in actions other
than contract, "interest may be
given, in the discretion of the ju-
ry."39 The California legislature
enacted section 3288 in 1872, and
the section has never been repealed
or amended since that date.
In an even more liberal ap-
proach, Alaska has enacted a stat-
ute granting prejudgment interest
as a matter of right. In 1965, the
Alaska legislature amended their
interest statute40 with the intent
that prejudgment interest be
awarded more liberally than previ-
ous judicial interpretations would
allow.4' The Alaska legislature rec-
ognized that failure to award pre-
judgment interest creates a sub-
stantial financial incentive for
defendants to litigate, and thus
defer payment to injured plaintiffs,
even when the liability is clear and
the jury award is predictable. 42 The
current Alaska statute imposes an
obligation on defendants in tort
actions to pay prejudgment inter-
est compounded from the date of
the injury.43
In New York, as in Illinois,
legislators are continuing their at-
tempts to amend current prejudg-
ment interest laws to allow pre-
judgment interest in personal
injury cases. New York Senate
Judiciary Chairman, Christopher
Mega, sponsored a prejudgment
interest bill that would direct the
payment of interest in personal
injury and product liability cases
from the date the lawsuit was com-
menced or six months after the
cause of action arose, whichever is
later.44 Unfortunately, the New
York bill has faced opposition
from the insurance industry, and
from the New York Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Prac-
tice.45 Despite lobbying efforts
from the New York State Trial
Lawyers Association and others,
the bill currently remains inac-
tive.46
B. Admiralty Law
Federal courts sitting in admi-
ralty have a long history of award-
ing prejudgment interest. In 1818
the United States Supreme Court
stated that the true measure of
damages in an admiralty case was
the "value of the property lost, at
the time of the loss.. .with interest
upon such valuation. ' 47 This con-
cept was reiterated in 1897 when
the Supreme Court stated, that as a
general rule, ship collision dam-
ages should be assessed as the value
of the property plus the interest
from the time of the accident. 48
Later, the United States Congress
expanded the general admiralty
rule allowing prejudgment interest
in wrongful death and personal
injury cases.49
Admiralty courts have justified
prejudgment interest awards be-
cause of the lost use theory. Admi-
ralty courts view damages as sus-
tained on a certain date, regardless
of when the court finally enters a
judgment. By awarding prejudg-
ment interest, admiralty courts at-
tempt to fully compensate plain-
tiffs for the lost use of the value of
the injury. 0
Nevertheless, prejudgment in-
terest is not compulsory. In admi-
ralty cases, courts retain discretion
whether or not to award prejudg-
ment interest to compensate the
injured party in full.5' However, it
is an abuse of discretion for admi-
ralty courts to deny prejudgment
interest absent peculiar circum-
stances. These circumstances may
include delay in litigation, mutual-
ity of fault, and uncertainty as to
liability. 2 Therefore, under this
discretionary approach, admiralty
courts are able to fairly and com-
pletely compensate injured parties
for the lost use of damages sus-
tained at the time of the injury.
V. Beneficial Effects of Awarding
Prejudgment Interest
A. Injured Party Fully Compensated
The primary purpose of person-
al injury litigation is to fully com-
pensate the injured parties for the
losses they have suffered within the
54 Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992
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scope of their legally recognized
interests. 53 Accepting this presup-
position as true, injured parties are
receiving something less than the
full amount of the loss sustained
when they are denied reasonable
prejudgment interest awards. A
judgment handed down several
years after an accident only pro-
vides the amount of damage sus-
tained at the time of the accident.
The plaintiff will not recover the
money that could have been
earned through investment at pre-
vailing market rates of return. Pre-
judgment interest can make up the
difference between the value of the
damages at the time of the acci-
dent, and the value of the damages
at the time of the judgment. Conse-
quently, judicial awards of pre-
judgment interest based on a rate
consistent with prevailing market
rates will achieve the goal of full
compensation for plaintiffs. 54
B. Reduction of Backlog of Civil
Litigation
Prejudgment interest awards in
personal injury cases can reduce
the backlog of cases that is current-
ly inhibiting the court system's
ability to award full compensation
to injured parties. The backlog
creates substantial delays in the
judicial process. The statistics on
the backlog of civil lawsuits in
Cook County, Illinois are stagger-
ing. At the start of 1990, there were
67,776 lawsuits pending in the Law
Division.55 Of these, 13,657, or 20
percent, were at least five years
old.56 According to recent studies,
the average length of time it had
taken a lawsuit to reach trial in
1988 was slightly more than six
years. 57 Further, compare those
statistics with the American Bar
Association's recommendation
that most personal injury lawsuits
should be resolved in two years. 58
These numbers indicate serious
delays in the litigation process, and
correspondingly, an ineffective-
ness of the courts to fully compen-
sate plaintiffs for their losses.5 9
One reason for the tremendous
backlog is that defendants have an
incentive to delay litigation. Due
to the enormous backlog of cases,
and the limited statutory provi-
sions for prejudgment interest
awards, defendants, particularly
insurance companies, can earn
huge profits while awaiting the
final judgment. It is standard prac-
tice in the insurance business to set
aside a "reserve" to cover unpaid
claims. 60 By not paying out settle-
ments, and keeping these reserves
invested, insurance companies can
reap a hefty profit. Thus, it is
reasonable to surmise that defen-
dants use a simple formula for
determining whether to settle a
case out of court, or to delay the
litigation as long as possible. If
defendants' costs are less than the
interest that can be earned on their
monetary reserves, then they will
allow the backlog of cases to push
the trial date back. To maximize
profits, insurance companies
would resist offering fair settle-
ments before trial so they can
invest the value of claims and earn
money above what it might have to
pay in six years when cases finally
go to trial. If a plaintiff eventually
does receive a favorable verdict,
the value of the award is less than
the value of the injury at the time
of the accident.
Injured parties are receiving
something less than the full
amount of the loss sustained
when they are denied
reasonable prejudgment
interest awards.
The potential profit defendants
may earn can be quite substantial.
For example, in a case where the
damages were estimated at be-
tween 115 and 500 million dollars,
the court calculated the interest
that the defendants or their insur-
ers may have earned, and plaintiffs
lost, was between 11.5 and 50
million dollars per year, or be-
tween $31,800 and $136,200 per
day. 61
Moreover, defendants who do
seek a settlement before trial typi-
cally offer a plaintiff a lower
amount than might be awarded
after a trial.62 Plaintiffs realize that
the settlement offer is worth more
today than the damages awarded at
trial would be in a few years. 63
Consequently, the knowledge that
prejudgment interest will not be
awarded as part of a favorable
verdict forces plaintiffs to accept
lower settlements, and therefore
receive inadequate compensation
for their injury.
One remedy to the backlog is
legislative enactment of broader
provisions for prejudgment inter-
est in civil litigation.64 Faced with
the prospect of paying out prejudg-
ment interest, defendants will ac-
tively pursue out of court settle-
ments, thereby reducing the
number of lawsuits pending. Pre-
judgment interest awards would
encourage early settlements by
eliminating the existing incentive
to delay litigation. If a defendant
has to pay the interest on the
money ultimately, there is no rea-
son to invest the money and wait
for the judgment. In fact, defen-
dants will have an incentive to
settle meritorious claims out of
court as early as possible to avoid
paying the interest that would ac-
crue up to the time of trial. As the
number of settlements increase,
the backlog of cases should corre-
spondingly decrease.
C. Jury Assessment of Damages
More Accurate
Those opposed to prejudgment
interest often argue that juries al-
ready take interest into account
when awarding damages, and if
prejudgment interest were allowed,
plaintiffs would be receiving dou-
ble their damages. 65 Although
there is evidence which indicates
that juries may be calculating inter-
est into damages, there is no way to
ascertain whether all jurors are
adding interest into the calcula-
tion, or how they arrive at their
numbers. 66 Judicial acceptance of
prejudgment interest would elimi-
nate the arbitrariness of implicit
jury awards of interest. Courts
would be able to instruct the jury to
disregard any delay considerations
because the court would award
interest on whatever damages the
jury determined. 67 Thus, jury as-
sessments of damages would be
made on a more accurate basis and
parties to the litigation would ben-
efit from greater certainty in esti-
mating the damages before trial.
D. Courts Would Have Discretion
to Award Prejudgment Interest
Critics of prejudgment interest
(continued on page 56)
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also claim that by awarding pre-
judgment interest, the roles would
be reversed, with plaintiffs then
having the incentive to delay litiga-
tion. 68 However, these concerns
are unfounded.
An analysis of cases in which
prejudgment interest is allowed,
such as cases arising under the laws
of admiralty, reveals that the
courts balance the equities in-
volved in a particular case before
awarding prejudgment interest.69
These courts carefully consider
whether the plaintiff delayed in
pursuing the litigation before
awarding prejudgment interest.
When there has been a delay in the
litigation, the courts look to other
factors to determine whether a
party is responsible for the delay.
These factors may include mutual-
ity of fault, uncertainty as to liabili-
ty and uncertainty as to the extent
of damages. 70 Other equitable fac-
tors may include bad faith esti-
mates of damages, or any frivolous
claims."
Therefore, a court's consider-
ation of all the equitable factors in
a case before allowing prejudgment
interest prevents plaintiffs from
taking advantage of the litigation
process.
VI. Proposed Modifications
for Prejudgment Interest
in Illinois
To facilitate judicial efficiency
in awarding prejudgment interest,
the Illinois legislature should enact
legislation that specifically ad-
dresses the inherent problems
found in the current system.
Bound by an archaic statute, Illi-
nois courts are forced to limit the
availability of prejudgment inter-
est in tort cases resulting in inade-
quate compensation for plaintiffs.
To achieve equitable results, courts
must formulate creative alterna-
tives to bypass the statute. These
recent judicial efforts to award
prejudgment interest in a broader
range of cases are laudable, but
unpredictable. A new statute, or
amendment to the existing statute,
must adopt specific provisions
which recognize prejudgment in-
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
terest as an essential element of
damages in tort actions. Prejudg-
ment interest is compensatory in
nature because it assists in placing
plaintiffs in the position they
would have been in if no injury had
occurred. To fully compensate in-
jured parties, new legislation must
provide for prejudgment interest
as a matter of right.
Further, new legislation must
eliminate the fixed interest rate
and provide for an alternative in-
dex that reflects current market
rates. A fixed statutory rate does
not allow for changes in the econo-
my. Consequently, plaintiffs may
receive more, or less, interest than
they could have earned on the
value of their damages. These arbi-
trary results could be eliminated
with the adoption of a uniformly
applied index rate based on an
established economic indicator.
For example, the interest rate
could correspond to the Prime
Lending Rate, or Federal Treasury
Bill rates. This would allow a more
accurate measure of the interest.
that could have accrued on the
value of plaintiffs loss through
investment, and at the same time,
allow greater predictability of
damages.
VII. Conclusion
Prejudgment interest is a neces-
sary element of damages to provide
full and fair compensation for
plaintiffs in tort cases. However,
current consumers of the Illinois
judicial system are being short
changed. Despite encouraging
trends in other jurisdictions, Illi-
nois courts adhere to an outdated
system that, in the vast majority of
cases, denies prejudgment interest
for injured parties. The Illinois
courts and legislature have failed
to recognize the costs associated
with delays inherent in the legal
system. By failing to award pre-
judgment interest, the system pro-
vides an incentive for defendants
to delay settlement at the expense
of injured plaintiffs. To remedy the
existing inequities, the Illinois Leg-
islature must enact a statute allow-
ing prejudgment interest as a mat-
ter of right in a broader range of
lawsuits.
Comprehensive new legislation
that applies prejudgment interest
to a broader range of injuries and
incorporates an appropriate inter-
est rate calculated from the time of
the plaintiff's loss, would fully
compensate victims for their loss-
es. In addition, such legislation
would reduce the backlog of law-
suits pending in the court system.
Until the Illinois Legislature
adopts such a statute, consumers
who are required to participate in
the Illinois judicial system will
continue to receive inadequate
compensation.
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